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1The noted Pakistani journalist, Najam Sethi, in a televised Urdu interview attempted to 
reason with Hyarbyar Marri, the London-domiciled scion of the Bugti tribe, that there 
are both ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ Panjabis to the allegation posed by the former as to why 
are Panjabis not just squatting and siphoning the resources of his province, Pakistan’s 
largest geographically and sparsest demographically, but, essentially, ‘finishing off his 
national identity’2. 
 
Paradigmatic then to trace a trajectory to the Panjabi hegemon as the locus of long-
standing grievances. But, Sethi and Myarri, two Pakistani Sunnis were, insofar as an 
orientalist as myself is concerned, engaged in a dialogue of the deaf. It is but 
symptomatic of centre-state relations predicated on contested sovereignty, 
alienation, irredentism and regional aspirations that were and remain a canker across 
the subcontinent (Balochistan, Balawaristan, Bangladesh, Eelam, Kashmir, Khalistan, 
Nagaland) and its near abroad (Iran’s Khuzistan, Kurdistan and Seistan va 
Balochistan; and China’s Uyghuristan).  
 
The historical ambivalence of Baloch tribal elites who expediently but not 
enthusiastically joined the new dominion is evinced in the blur between ethnic and 
confessional belonging demonstrated by them and their then Sunni, Hanafi 
compatriots from the eastern Bengali wing which seceded in 1971. It is, as pointed 
out above, also noticeable in the homonymous province, also Iran’s largest, of that 
Islamic republic’s Seistan and Balochistan, whose restive Sunnis have felt the harsh 
hand of a Twelver Shia majority which suppresses or downplays outright opposition or 
assertions of socio-cultural autonomy as a threat to the 1979 revolution and the living 
misery of a Muslim republic spawned by it. 
         
The confrontational lines are clear, even cursorily to a chance observer, what with 
other atavistic, sectarian struggles now being played out across other Muslim lands 
such as Bahrain, Iraq and Syria. Present-day Pakistan’s Balochistan, like erstwhile East 
Pakistan, is principally Sunni with a conspicuous Twelver Shia (Hazara) community 
inhabiting the environs of Quetta. The establishment bats on a sticky wicket: it is less 
unable and more unwilling to tackle domestic, non-Baloch, Sunni terrorists intent on 
decimating an already outraged, humiliated, impoverished, provincial citizenry; and 
it is flat-footed in imaginatively weaning away Baloch, Sunni dissidents espousing a 
nationalist line who, ironically, take a cue from the Qaid-e Azam whose raison d’être 
for an Indian Muslim homeland was postulated on their non-negotiable recognition 
as not a minority but a nation. Indira Gandhi’s response at the end of 1971, when 
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queried about her views on the two-nation theory, was that it lay in the Bay of 
Bengal. A champagne socialist Sindhi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—whose political ambition 
and personal contumacy in no mean measure led to the dismemberment of 
Pakistan—and the Shah of Pahlavi Iran, both Twelver Shi‘is, put paid to any such 
ambitions harboured by Balochs ‘attempting to do a Bengal’ some forty years ago.    
 
It is a truism which, in the post-9/11 era, merits rehearsal here in that no drone attacks 
occur across Balochistan or its provincial capital where not a few of the Taleban 
leadership are comfortably ensconced — Quetta, unsurprisingly, is rife with ISI agents.  
Shuja Nawaz, brother of a former army chief of staff, General Asif Nawaz, narrates in 
his authoritative account3 that most ISI personnel were seldom seen at the agency’s 
Aabpara headquarters in Islamabad but away at prayers, barnstorming across 
Central Asia in the early to mid 1990s to establish ‘safe houses’ or embark on causes 
for the glory of Islam. A decade on, and a year before the Abbotabad showdown, 
Prime Minister Cameron declared that Pakistan ‘is looking both ways’. In that very 
year, 2010, LSE’s Matthew Waldman published a foregone conclusion for his report 
consisted of interviews with  some ten Taleban commanders, all of whom remarked, 
with frontier forthrightness, about the presence of ISI ‘participants or observers’ on the 
Quetta Shura Council.  
 
This is only natural considering that General Kayani exclaimed that his security 
obsession remains India. Herein lies the nub: the ISI, not a wit wiser, despite 
Abbotabad, PNS Mehran, Hamza Camp and, make no mistake, audacious attacks 
assuredly in the offing, throws no caution to an ill wind which blows a blowback. This 
neurotic, pernicious, self-destructive ‘strategic depth’ fixation about India—and the 
military, still seething, because memories are longer in the orient than occident, even 
a generation later, about Bengal ’71—is worth paying any and every price including 
the internal coherence and cohesion of the armed forces to say nothing, existentially, 
of Pakistan. And Balochistan, therefore, is one among Pakistan’s badlands alongside 
the tribal areas. What complicates the Baloch scenario is that the Russians, Chinese, 
Indians and Iranians do not look at these disgruntled natives nestled between a 
strategically located littoral and a mineral-rich hinterland with sheep eyes. The Sino-
Pakistani impress has, for now, come to stay. Beijing, the archetypal colonial trader—
a role it has sought long given justified Sinitic hubris—of the southern hemisphere is not 
hesitant about dealing with Islamabad so long as its own Sunni, Uyghur dissidents 
hailing from Xinjiang receive neither spiritual nor strategic sustenance from ISI-
subvented outfits and camps dotted across the NWFP, southern Panjab or Northern 
Areas — Pakistan cannot afford to lose goodwill in a region where its Uzbek, Iranian 
and Chinese neighbours have privately admonished Islamabad about aiding and 
abetting their peripatetic insurgents, whether salafist or jihadist, both of whom, thanks 
to the ISI’s outreach programme, find a homestead in Pakistan.   
 
To return to the title: is the international community keen on welcoming yet another 
Stan in the global comity? Balochistan’s Muslim and non-Muslim neighbours are, in a 
word, not. The former are decidedly uneasy of yet another ‘brother’ Muslim entrant in 
the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)—the very picture of an impotent 
talking-shop—and the latter, especially India, including its Hindu hawks, are not 
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thrilled at seeing a nuclear Pakistan balkanised. (Congress and its Nehru had, on the 
eve of partition, decided to ‘cut off the head in order to get rid of the headache’. 
The rider was that the provinces contracting out of the Indian union could neither 
return severed nor together as a polity seeking equal parity in a restructured 
confederation.) Kashmir, for instance, is going nowhere — definitely not to the 
General Assembly or OIC for it need not be overemphasised that no Indian 
administration will compromise on a province through which the headwaters—and 
lifeline—of northern India, partly, and Pakistan, entirely, flow.  
  
So is an independent client state in the pipeline?4 Just what will the Baloch bring to 
the table as a balanced, well-oiled, Makrani pivot for southwest Afghanistan and 
southwest Asia is a task for the futurist, not orientalist. It remains to be seen if the 
Baloch, fractious, reactionary, poorly-equipped, politically inarticulate feudatories (in 
sharp contrast to metropolitan, literate, activist Bengalis) are dependable, responsible 
players. Hazhava sar! ki che gon-datha?5 But, first things first — can Kayani deliver 
Haqqani?  
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 M. L. Dames, Popular poetry of the Baloches, vol. II (London, 1907), p. 39. Transl. ‘Wonderful head! 
What idea has overtaken you?’  
